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Introduction -1 
 
 
Population: 2.3 million 
Major Industry: 
 Rice-related 
 Metal processing 
 
Is known as: 
 High-quality rice, sake 
 A lot of snow in winter 
 A lot of disasters 
 (ex. earthquakes, flood, heavy snow) 
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Tokyo 
Oosaka 
350km 
Niigata 
Introduction -2 
Lectures: 
 Production Planning and Control 
 Production Information Systems 
 Logistics 
 Simulation Modeling (with Arena) 
 
Research Interests: 
 Simulation Modeling and Analysis of Traffic Systems, Logistics 
Systems and Production Systems. 
 Simulation Teaching Method with Arena. 
 
 
But, Today… 
Because, … 
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Problems 
On the other hand; 
 Much has been emphasized about the impacts of human and physical 
visible damages since disasters struck.  
 
 There are a lot of studies about disaster in terms of seismology, 
meteorology, geology, structural mechanics, etc. 
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In spite of  our experiences in huge disasters,  
we haven’t tried to unveil invisible damages, such as interruption in supply 
chain network, and production system. 
But, the Invisible damages, such as supply chain network, production 
system has been obstructed, not revealed. 
Objective 
To unveil invisible damages. 
 
 The affects to the supply chain network, production system in 
Japanese automobile manufacturers by these disasters.  
 
 
To unveil fundamental issues of their damages. 
 
 Why did automobile manufacturers immediately decide all assembly 
plants’ shutdown? 
 What’s the difference disaster and depression. 
 Is “the limitation of the JIT” really exists, or not? 
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Outline 
1. Recent Disasters in Japan 
 
2. Structure of Automobile Industry in Japan 
 
3. Riken’s Kashiwazaki Plant  
 (2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake) 
 
4. Renesas Electronics Corporation’s Naka Plant  
 (2011 Tohoku Earthquake) 
 
5. Summary of Earthquake Effects on Production 
1. Recent Disaster in Japan 
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The Tohoku Earthquake and 
Tsunami (11 March 2011)  
The Tohoku Earthquake and 
Tsunami (11 March 2011)  
Major Earthquake in Japan (since 1995) 
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2011 Tohoku 
2003 Hokkaido 
2008 Iwate 
2004 Niigata Chuetsu 
2007 Noto 
1995 Kobe 
2001 Geigo 
2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore 
Date Magnitude 
Seismic 
Intensity  
(Shindo) 
Earthquake Injuries Deaths Missing 
Height of 
Tsunami 
11 Mar 
2011 
M9 7 
2011 Tohoku Earthquake 
and Tsunami 
26,992 15,854 3,155 
over 
930cm 
14 Jun 
2008 
M7.2 6+ 2008 Iwate Earthquake 426 17 6 32cm 
16 Jul 
2007 
M6.8 6+ 
2007 Niigata Chuetsu-
Offshore Earthquake 
2,316 15 0 -  
25 Mar 
2007 
M6.9 6+ 2007 Noto Earthquake 359 1 0 22cm 
23 Oct 
2004 
M6.8 7 
2004 Niigata Chuetsu 
Earthquake 
4,163 68 0 -  
26 Sep 
2003 
M8 6- 2003 Hokkaido Earthquake 849 1 1 255cm 
24 Mar 
2001 
M6.7 6- 2001 Geiyo Earthquake 288 2 0 -  
17 Jul 
1995 
M7.3 7 1995 Kobe Earthquake 43,800 6,434 3 -  
Seismic Centers  
Magnitude: The Degree of Energy 
Seismic Intensity: The Degree of Shaking 
Urban side Countryside 
The 92% of Deaths and Missing: Tsunami 
Almost every human damage: crushed under houses or furniture  
2. Structure of Automobile Industry in Japan 
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Automobile Products  
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Major Components (Body, Engine, Transmission…) 
Sub-assembly, Components 
Components 
4th Tier 
: 
Raw Material Manufacturer  
1st Tier 
2nd Tier 
3rd Tier 
(30,000-40,000 components) 
Suppliers supply 
Automobile Manufacturers 
Suppliers furnish 
Similarly, suppliers in the lower tier furnish 
components to companies in the higher tier. 
                   1 car needs 30,000-40,000 components 
assemble cars  
Supply Chain Network of Automobile Industry in Japan -1 
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Automobile  
Manufacturers 
1st Tier  
4th  
2nd Tier  2nd Tier  
4th  4th  4th  4th  4th  4th  4th  
3rd  3rd  3rd  3rd  
Keiretsu Keiretsu 
Automobile Manufacturers 
4th Tier 
: 
Raw Material Manufacturer  
1st Tier 
2nd Tier 
3rd Tier 
Pyramidal Structure 
The Japanese automobile industry was like a pyramid, 
divided into three or any more tiers of suppliers, centered on 
the automobile manufacturers at the top of the hierarchy. 
Supply Chain Network of Automobile Industry in Japan -2 
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Keiretsu Keiretsu Keiretsu 
Pyramidal Structure 
Diamond Structure 
Supply Chain Network of Automobile Industry in Japan -3 
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1st Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd  
1st Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd  
1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd  
1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd  
Automobile 
Manufacture 
Automobile 
Manufacture 
Crisis in the 1990’s 
 the collapse of ‘bubble’ economy 
 the yen’s appreciation (1990:140 yen, 1995:79 yen to the dollar) 
 the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, 
 the increase of the consumption tax (from 3% to 5%; 1997).  
accelerated  
 shifting of production to overseas site, 
 moving toward optimal parts,  
 promotion of the establishment of a 
global supply network. The first and second tier parts are 
decentralized suppliers, the lower tier parts are 
centralized in specific companies that has the  
specialized process technology 
Decentralized 
Centralized 
This situation was described in “ the Japanese 
Automobile Industry “ (Shimokawa 1994). 
 Although, automobile assembly plants 
not damage, they were interrupted. 
Because the supply from the suppliers 
in the lower tiers stopped. 
The impacts of automobile industry 
affected in the ‘Keiretsu’ group. 
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1st 
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2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
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3rd 
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1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd 
Tier  
Automobile 
Manufacture 
Automobile 
Manufacture 
1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd  3rd  3rd  3rd  
1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd  3rd  3rd  3rd  
Automobile 
Manufacture 
Automobile 
Manufacture 
If Disaster Suffers in the Lower Suppliers’ Plant, … 
 
In this situation of centralized suppliers 
in the lower tiers; if these suppliers are 
affected by a disaster, the production at 
supplier’s plant stop, then almost every 
automobile manufacturer are affected 
by it. 
Pyramidal Structure 
Diamond Structure 
Keiretsu 
3. Riken’s Kashiwazaki Plant  
The 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake 
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Source: The Asahi Shinbun Digital (20 July 2007)  
Source: The Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan (Page of Disaster prevention)  
Source: Riken 
Center of the 2007 Niigata 
Chuetsu-offshore 
Riken’s  
Kashiwazaki Plant 
Capital ¥8,573,597,000 (as of March 2011, all of Riken Corporation) 
Number of Employees 1,627 (as of March 2011, all of Riken Corporation) 
Major Products Piston Ring  
 Engine parts 
 Approx. 50% of domestic market share 
Seal Ring  
 Transmission parts 
 Approx. 70% of domestic market share 
Riken Corporation 
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Automobile Engine 
Riken’s Piston Rings -1 
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• Piston ring is an oligopolistic market.  
– Riken(49.9%) 
– Teikoku Piston Ring (TPR: 30.2%) 
– Nippon Piston Ring(NPR:19.9%)  
 
• Approx. 20% of world market share. 
 
• 1/2 of the domestic cars and 1/5 of the world 
cars have Riken’s piston rings. 
Riken 
49.9 
TPR 30.2 
NPR 19.9 
Domestic Market Share 
Piston Ring 
Riken’s Piston Rings -2 
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Source: Daniel E. Supply Chain Disruption Risk and Recovery: temporary Diversification and Its Limits, 2011 
Riken 
49.9 
TPR 30.2 
NPR 19.9 
HONDA 
19.2% 
TOYOTA 
16.7% 
SUZUKI 
15.7% 
MAZDA 
14.7% 
NISSAN 
14.3% 
SUBARU 
6.0% 
MITSUBISHI 
4.9% 
DAIHATSU 3.9% 
Others 4.6% 
Riken  Automobile Manufacturers 
Center of the 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake 
Riken’s  
Kashiwazaki Plant 
Riken’s Damages by the 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake 
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• Human Damages:  
– A few employees injured. 
– Many employees were destroyed their 
house by Earthquake. 
  
• Property Damages: 
– Machines  100 million yen 
– Inventories  200 million yen 
– Recovery Cost  1,200 million yen 
Date Magnitude JMA Seismic Intensity  Injuries Deaths 
16 Jul 2007 
10:13 a.m. 
M6.8 6+ 2,316 15 
Source: The Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan (Page of Disaster prevention)  
Holiday 
Chronological Events at Riken’s Kashiwazaki Plant (Operations) 
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Date 
Days 
Later 
Events Operations 
16 July 
2007 
0 
The 2007 Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake struck at 10:13 a.m. 
All the production lines at Riken’s Kashiwazaki plat had stopped. 
Toyota sent Riken about 20 employees to assess the situation of the damages. 
0% 
17 July - 
2007 
1 6 companies voluntarily provided 41 assistances to Riken’s Kashiwazaki Plant.  0% 
18 July 
2007 
2 Mazda sent Riken 8 employees.  0% 
19 July -
2007 
3 
There were total 700 skilled volunteers from automobile manufacturers and 
parts manufacturers. ( Toyota:200 employees, Mazda: 13 maintenance engineers) 
0% 
22 July 
2007 
6 Riken started trial operation. 0% 
23 July 
2007 
7 
Riken resumed productions of major products (piston rings, seal rings, and camshafts) at 
10 a.m. 
Part of the lines didn’t resume yet.  
25 companies provided 830 assistances 23-24 July. 
Almost 
100% 
1 August 
2007 
16 Riken announced Riken’s complete recovery. 100% 
Source: Press Release of Riken and articles of Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan’s most prestigious economic newspaper) 
The Key Factor of Riken’s Recovery:  Team Work beyond Keiretsu Group 
Total 9,000 people from 25 automobile manufacturers / parts manufacturers.   
Source: The Asahi Shinbun Digital 
 (20 July 2007)  
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Toyota 
Hokaidou 
Riken’s Kashiwazaki Plant  
Honda Saitama 
Nissan Tochigi 
Honda Tochigi 
Subaru Tochigi 
Nissan Iwaki 
Nissan Kanagawa 
Nissan Oppama 
Nissan Shatai 
Suzuki Takatsuka 
Suzuki Kosai 
Suzuki Iwata 
Suzuki Sagara 
Suzuki Osuka 
Subaru Gunma 
Subaru Yashima 
Toyota Honsya 
Toyota Motomachi 
Toyota kamigo 
Toyota Takaoka 
Toyota Tutumi 
Toyota Akechi 
Toyota Shimoyama 
Toyota Iura 
Toyota Tawara 
Toyota Teihou 
Toyota Hirose 
Toyota Shatai Honsya 
Toyota shatai Yoshiwara 
Suzuki Toyokawa 
Mitsubishi Okazaki 
Honda Suzuka 
Toyota Shatai Inabe 
Toyota Kyusyu 
Daihatsu Kyusyu 
Nissan Shatai Kyusyu 
Daihatsu Kyusyu 
Honda Kumamoto 
Mazda Hofu 
Mazda Honsya 
Mazda Mitugi 
Mitsubishi Mizushima 
Mitsubishi Kyoto 
Daihatsu Kyoto 
Daihatsu Ikeda 
Mitsubishi Gifu 
Center of 
 Earthquake 
Earthquake Reductions Productions 
The 1995 Kobe 
Earthquake 
14,021  
(January 1995) 
January 1994: 772,858  
January 1995: 758,837 
The 2007 Niigata Chuetsu 
- offshore Earthquake 
101,636  
(July 2007) 
July 2006: 977,856 
July 2007: 876,220 
Comparison of Operations of Major 8 Automobile Manufacturers 
Comparison of Reductions in Productions by the Earthquake 
Source: the AMDS of JAMA. 
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Honda                                   
Mazda                                 
Mitsubishi                                 
Subaru                                   
Suzuki                                 
Daihatsu                                   
Riken                                 
  All plants operated 
  Some plants operated partially 
  All plants stopped operation  
Riken’s Affects to Japanese Automobile Manufacturers 
The Changes(%) from the Previous Year of the Products and Exports 
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Products Exports 
Source: Active Matrix Database System of JAMA.  
Note: The previous year’s result indexed at 100.  
Number of the domestic finished products. Number of the exports units in domestic productions. 
In July, 7 automobile manufacturers excluding 
Mitsubishi fell below products of the same month of 
the previous year.  
 Suzuki -22,413 units (-22.0%) 
 Nissan  -22,667 units (-20.9%) 
 --- 
 Mitsubishi +4,836 units (+7.7%)  
HONDA 19.2% 
TOYOTA 16.7% 
SUZUKI 15.7% 
MAZDA 14.7% 
NISSAN 14.3% 
SUBARU 6.0% 
MITSUBISH
I 4.9% 
DAIHATSU 3.9% 
Others 4.6% 
Ruken’s Piston Ring 
Earthquake Earthquake 
The Changes of the Domestic Products of All Automobile Manufacturers 
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Source: Active Matrix Database System of JAMA.  
Note: The previous year’s result indexed at 100.  
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• Amount of the domestic production 
decreased in August rather than July.  
• This was not due to Riken’s effects.  
• This reason was that all most every 
company in Japan takes summer 
holiday in August.  
• The change from the previous year in 
August was 106.44%.  
• Automobile manufacturers were 
affected by Riken’s shutdown in July.  
The Changes (Units) of the Products 
The Changes (%) from the previous year 
of the Products 
The Riken’s Strategy against a Disaster 
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after the 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake 
Riken’s Saitama 
Warehouse 
Riken’s  
Kashiwazaki Plant 
Automobile Manufacturers’  
Assembly Plants 
  
Riken’s Aichi 
Warehouse 
Facilities 
 New 2 warehouses (stocks for 2 weeks). 
 Riken’s Aichi Warehouse 
 Riken’s Saitama Warehouse 
 
Alternative Production 
 Production of piston rings spread to 2 foreign plants.  
 Riken Automobile Parts Co., Ltd. (Wuhan, China) 
 Allied Ring Corporation (Michigan, U.S.A) 
 
Standardization of Products  
 TPR (Teikoku Piston Ring) 
 NPR (Nippon Piston Ring) 
4. Renesas Electronics Corporation’s Naka Plant 
The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake 
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300-mm line Renesas Electronics 
Corporation’s Naka Plant 
Source: Corporate Outline of REC’s. 
Source: Corporate Outline of REC’s. 
Renesas Electronics Corporation (REC) 
25 Source: Corporate Outline of REC’s. 
  Front-end Line 
 (Wafer Fabrication:10 plants) 
  Back-end Line  
(Assembly & Test : 12 plants) Capital ¥153.2 billion 
Major Products 
 
1. Microcontroller 
2. System LSIs/SoC Devices 
3. Analogue & Power Devices 
Employees 44,000 (Consolidated). 
Group 
Companies 
In Japan 
 1 Sales Companies. 
 14 Manufacturing and Engineering Service Companies. 
 7 Design and Application Technologies Companies. 
 2 Business Corporations and Others. 
Overseas 
 11 Sales Companies. 
 8 Manufacturing and Engineering Service Companies. 
 4 Design and Application Technologies Companies. 
 6 Business Corporations and Others. 
NEC
Hitachi
Mitsubishi 
Electric
NEC
Electronics
Renesas
Technology
Subsidiary
Renesas
Electronics
Integration
Integration
Apr. 2003
Nov. 2002
Apr. 2010
  Front-end Line 
 (Wafer Fabrication:10 plants) 
  Back-end Line  
(Assembly & Test : 12 plants) 
REC’s Plant 
REC’s Naka Plan 
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Address Hitachinaka City, Ibaraki Prefecture 
Major 
Product 
(REC’s Naka 
Plant) 
  
 Microcontroller 
The Naka Plant produces a little fewer than 20% 
MCUs in all REC. 
 System LSIs/SoC Devices 
 Analogue & Power Devices. 
The Naka Plant produces a little fewer than 10% of 
REC’s Analogue & Power Devices. 
Source: Corporate Outline of REC’s. 
300-mm line REC’s Naka Plant 
Source: Corporate Outline of 
REC’s. 
REC’s Microcontroller (MCU) 
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 REC’s is the world’s largest manufacturers of microcontroller with market share (27.3%).  
 It takes 2 months to produce one MCU from fabrication. 
 There are about 1,000 processes. 
 A car needs over 50 MCUs, and a high grade car needs about 100 MCUs. 
 Most Japanese cars are loaded REC’s MCUs. 
REC (JP) 
30.0% 
Freescale 
Semiconductor 
(US) 10.0% 
Atmel Corporation 
(US), 6.0% 
Microchip 
Technology (US), 
6.5% 
Infineon 
Technologies (DE), 
5.8% 
Texas Instruments 
(US), 5.5% 
Fujitsu (JP), 6.8% 
NXP Semiconductors 
(NL), 5.0% 
Others 17.9% 
REC (JP) 
41.5% 
Freescale 
Semiconductor 
(US) 17.4% 
Texas 
Instruments 
(US), 4.9% 
Fujitsu (JP), 
7.0% 
Microchip 
Technology (US), 
5.0% 
NXP 
Semiconductors 
(NL), 3.5% 
STMicroelectronic
s (SH), 2.1% 
Atmel Corporation 
(US), 0.7% 
Others 17.9% 
2010 MCU Market 2010 Automotive MCU Market 
Source:  Databeans Estimates, Company Reports  
Note:  Amount of the MCU revenue was 14.8 billion dollar in 2010.  
           Amount of the automotive MCU revenue was 5.36 billion dollar in 2010. 
REC’s Damages by the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake 
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  REC’s Naka Plant 
  Center of Earthquake  
  Front-end line 
 (wafer fabrication:10 plants) 
  Back-end line  
(assembly & test : 12 plants) 
     temporarily shut down  
Repair cost of fixed assets 43,116 
Loss on disposal of inventories 7,283 
Loss on disposal of fixed assets 6,187 
Fixed costs during the temporary shutdown 
period of operations 
5,919 
Loss on cancellation of lease contracts 2,987 
Other 12 
Sub total 65,504 
Insurance income receivable (-16,000) 
Total 49,504 
(In millions of yen)  Loss on Disaster 
Source: News Release of REC (as of 18 May). 
The Key Factor of REC’s Recovery:  Team Work beyond Keiretsu Group, Industry  
 Automobile manufacturers, Electrical manufacturers, construction industry. 
 Total 80,000 people, max 2,500 assistances per day. 
 24h a day, 7days a week recovery operation. 
Naka Plant’s Resumption Plan 
1 August 
(estimated in 21 March) 
15 July 
(28 March) 
15 June 
(22 April) 
1 June 
(11 May) 2 Months Reduce 
Front-end line: 5 plants 
Back-end line: 3 plants 
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  REC’s Naka Plant 
  Center of 
Earthquake  
  Front-end line 
 (Wafer Fabrication:10 plants) 
  Back-end line  
(Assembly & Test : 12 plants) 
  temporarily shut down  
Date 
Days 
Later 
Events 
11 March, 2011 0 
The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake struck at 2:46 p.m. 
7 (include Naka Plant) out of 22 of REC’s plants in Japan have temporarily shut 
down production. 
REC’s production volume felt to approximately 50%. 
13-14 March, 2011 2-3 
8 REC’s offices/sites in Japan had been impacted from the blackout measure by 
Tokyo Electric Power Company, These offices/sites shut down operation production. 
23 April, 2011 43 Naka Plant started test production at the 200-mm wafer fabrication line.  
25 April, 2011 45 Naka Plant started test production at the 300-mm wafer fabrication line.  
1 June, 2011 82 200-mm wafer fabrication line started mass production. 
6 June, 2011 87 System LSI (300-mm) wafer fabrication line started mass production. 
June 2011   REC’s production volume recovered to approximately 85%. 
Mid-September 
2011    The supply(shipment) capacity returned to that more than  pre-earthquake (100%). 
Chronological Events at REC’s Naka Plant 
Source: Press Release of REC and articles of Nihon Keizai Shinbun 
Source: REC’s Annual Report. 
2011 Tohoku Earthquake’s Affects to Japanese Automobile Manufactures 
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Earthquake Reductions Productions 
The 1995 Kobe Earthquake 
14,021  
(January 1995) 
January 1994: 772,858  
January 1995: 758,837 
The 2007 Chuetsu-offshore 
Earthquake 
101,636  
(July 2007) 
July 2006: 977,856 
July 2007: 876,220 
The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake 
541,283 
 (March 2011) 
March 2010: 945,220 
March 2009: 403,937 
Comparison of Reductions in Productions by the Earthquake 
Comparison of Operations of Major 8 Automobile Manufacturers in Japan 
Source: the AMDS of JAMA. 
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The Changes(%) from the Previous Year 
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Products Exports 
Note: The previous year’s result indexed at 100.  
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Number of the domestic finished products. Number of the exports units in domestic productions. 
Earthquake Earthquake 
In March and April, all automobile 
manufacturers considerably fell below 
products of the same month of the 
previous year. 
   In April  
 Honda   -59,017 units (-80.0%) 
 Toyota -217,790 units (-62.7%) 
Approx. 80% of Honda’s cars used REC’s MCUs, 
and Honda was decreasing stocks of semiconductor 
because it had just ordered new one immediately 
before the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake. 
There was the lack of approx. 500 types of 
components immediately after earthquake, the lack 
of approx. 150 types in April, and the lack of 30 types 
in May. 
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from Mar 20 through Jan 2012  
In April, there was down 60.1% 
from the same month in the 
previous year.  
 
It took 5 months until the domestic 
production of all automobile 
manufacturers in Japan returned to 
normal production. 
60.1%  
5 months 
The Changes (%) from the previous year 
of the Products 
The Changes (Units) of the Products 
The REC’s Provision against a Disaster 
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after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake 
  Naka Plant 
  Front-end Line 
 (Wafer Fabrication:10 plants) 
  Back-end Line  
(Assembly & Test : 12 plants) 
April 2011 
Facilities 
Making 10 plants strong enough so that REC can resume 
production within 1 month after an earthquake.  
 Until the end of 2013. 
 30 billion yen. 
 
Alternative Production 
(In April 2001)  
 Tsugaru Plant 
 Sanjo Plant 
 Singapore Plant of GlobalFoundries  
( the world third largest Independent semiconductor 
foundry) 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vwkdf7j65IQ&lr=1&feature=mhee 
Singapore Plant  
GlobalFoundries’ 
  Tsugaru Plant 
  Sanjo Plant 
5. Summary of Earthquake Effects on Production 
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Comparison of Automobile Manufacturer’s Recovery Time -1 
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2007 Niigata 2011 Tohoku 
Still all plants 
stopped 
All plants was 
Stopping 
Still all plants 
resumed 
Still all plants 
stopped 
All plants was 
Stopping 
Still all plants 
resumed 
Toyota  2.5 4.5 9 3 14 38 
Nissan 4 5 9 1 18 38 
Honda 7 1 9 4 9 31 
Mazda 5 2 9 3 8 24 
Mitsubishi 4 3 9 3 2 38 
Subaru 2.5 5.5 9 3 9 25 
Suzuki 3 4 9 3 8 25 
Daihatsu 2.5 3.5 9 4 7 38 
Average 3.8 3.6 9.0 3.0 9.4 32.1 (days) 
Toyota 
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Operation at all plants  
 
Part of operation at some plants  
 
No operation at all plants  
Automobile manufacturers decided that all assembly plants stopped 
operation from 3.8 or 3.0 days after the earthquake.  Why? 
Toyota Production System - JIT 
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JIT Making only 
 what is needed, 
 when it is needed, 
 and in the amount needed! 
 
Reducing in-process Inventory 
If disaster strike anywhere there are automobile parts manufacturers’ plants, 
Nothing in-process Inventories 
All automobile manufacturers’ assembly plants will be interrupted immediately. 
Toyota Production System - Jidoka 
37 
Jidoka 自動化 
自働化 
1. If an abnormal situation on the production line arises. 
2. The affected machine automatically stops, and the worker will 
stop the production line.  
3. The worker fixes or the immediate condition. 
4. Investigate the root cause and take a measure. 
= Automation 
= Automation with human touch Correct! 
If disaster strike, ( = abnormal situation) 
All automobile manufacturer’s production lines/plants stopped immediately. 
There were not wrong decisions for Japanese automobile manufacturers to stop 
production lines/plants by both these disasters. 
Comparison of Automobile Manufacturer’s Recovery Time -2 
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Riken (2007 Niigata) REC (2011 Tohoku) 
Still all plants 
stopped 
All plants was 
Stopping 
Still all plants 
resumed 
Still all plants 
stopped 
All plants was 
Stopping 
Still all plants 
resumed 
Toyota  2.5 4.5 9 3 14 38 
Nissan 4 5 9 1 18 38 
Honda 7 1 9 4 9 31 
Mazda 5 2 9 3 8 24 
Mitsubishi 4 3 9 3 2 38 
Subaru 2.5 5.5 9 3 9 25 
Suzuki 3 4 9 3 8 25 
Daihatsu 2.5 3.5 9 4 7 38 
Average 3.8 3.6 9.0 3.0 9.4 32.1 (days) 
Toyota 
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Operation at all plants  
 
Part of operation at some plants  
 
No operation at all plants  
If it takes long time to resume, what are affects to automobile manufacturers? 
The Changes(%) of the Domestic Automobile Products 
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2007 Niigata  
Months later 
2011 Tohoku  
89.60% 
106.44% 
101.17% 
109.10% 
103.79% 
101.50% 
108.72% 
109.02% 
102.26% 
105.39% 106.77% 104.67% 
42.73% 
39.90% 
69.06% 
86.12% 
91.13% 
101.79% 
95.52% 
120.33% 
104.50% 
113.42% 
118.56% 119.68% 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Source: Active Matrix Database System of JAMA.  
Note: The previous year’s result indexed at 100.  
2007 Niigata 
2011 Tohoku 5 months 
The delay of production’s resumption 
The delay of production’s recovery 
1 month 
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What we have to recognize things 
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Kobe Earthquake 
Niigata Chuetsu-
offshore Earthquake 
Lehman 
Shock 
Tohoku  
Earthquake 
Chronological Changes of the Domestic Products 
Jan. 1995 – Jan. 2012 
1. The Impacts to Supply to Automobiles Manufacturers 
Disaster’s impacts were not more than the depression’s impacts. 
2. Recovery Speed of Supply to Automobiles Manufacturers 
Recovery speeds at disaster were quicker rather than the depression. 
Was JIT good or no good? 
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Normal 
Inventory 
Level / Cost 
Transportation  
L.T. / Cost 
Environment 
Adaptability 
JIT Low / Low Short / High High 
Non JIT High / High Long / Low Low 
Abnormal 
(Disaster) 
Shutdown 
of Plants  
Loss on disposal 
of Inventories 
Recovery Speed 
of Plants 
JIT 
Damaged Plants: 
       Immediately 
Other Plants: 
        Earlier 
Damaged Plants: 
             Low 
Other Plants: 
               Non 
Damaged Plants: 
        High    
Other Plants: 
        High 
Non JIT 
Damaged Plants: 
       Immediately 
Other Plants: 
        Later/Avoid 
Damaged Plants: 
            High 
Other Plants: 
             Non 
Damaged Plants: 
       Low 
Other Plants: 
        Low 
Abnormal 
(Depression) 
Storage 
Time 
Inventory 
Cost 
Inventory 
Risk 
JIT Constant (short) Constant (Low) Constant (Low) 
Non JIT Longer Higher Higher 
It is impossible to say definitely that ‘The Limitations of JIT’ exists 
“Recovery Speed” 
are  
very importance! 
Many articles that insist 
‘the Limitations of JIT’ 
has emphasized this 
point. 
There were not wrong 
decisions for Japanese 
automobile 
manufacturers to stop 
production lines/plants 
by both these disaster. 
1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd 
Tier  
1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
3rd 
Tier  
Automobile 
Manufacture 
Automobile 
Manufacture 
If plant suffer disaster, … 
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1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
1st 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
2nd 
Tier  
Automobile 
Manufacture 
Automobile 
Manufacture 
In future 
Riken & REC 
Riken  
      Alternative Production:  
2 foreign plants 
REC 
       Alternative Production:  
 2 Domestic Plants  
 GlobalFoundries 
Nodes of the Mutual Complement Network 
of Production 
the Mutual Complement Network 
Almost every automobile 
manufacturer affected by 
earthquake. 
To build the mutual 
complement network of 
production, It will reduce 
the affects to companies 
in the upper tier. 
Conclusion 
Invisible damages were unveiled. 
 The affects to the supply chain network, production system in 
Japanese automobile manufacturers by these disasters.  
 As for recovery speed from disasters, JIT operated to advantage to 
the Japanese automobile industry. 
 
Fundamental issues of their damages were unveiled. 
 As for TPS, there were not wrong decisions for Japanese 
automobile manufacturers to stop production lines/plants by both 
these disasters. 
 The comparison of disaster and depression in terms of the 
decreasing speed/volume of supply and the recovery speed. 
 It is impossible to say definitely that the limitation of the JIT exists.  
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Vision for Future Research 
44 
• The affects to Japanese automobile industry by the floods in 
Thailand in 2011  
 
• Simulation modelling/analysis of the affects to supply chain 
network by disasters.  
45 
Thank you for your kind attention. 
